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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
- VS. -

MELVIN CANFIELD,

Case No.
10559

Defenden t-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
The appellant, Melvin Canfield, was convicted
of the crime of murder in the second degree on jury
trial in the Third Judicial District, Salt Lake County.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The appellant was bound over for trial in the
district court and charged by information with the
crime of murder in the second degree. Jury was had
m the District Court of Salt Lake County on September 27, 1965. The jury returned a verdict of guilty as
charged, and the Honorable Aldon J. Anderson imposed sentence upon the appellant of confinement
for the indeterminant sentence provided by law.
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Appellant's appeal was not timely filed, and
respondent filed a motion to dismiss which was
taken under advisement by this court and denied.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent submits the conviction should
be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The respondent submits that the following statement of facts is more in keeping with the rule that
the evidence on appeal will be viewed in a light
most favorable to the jury's verdict, and is more in
keeping with the actual state of the record.
The appellant was charged in the information
with killing Douglas Holland on May 10, 1965, in
Salt Lake County in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§§ 76-30-1 to -3 (1953) (R. 1.).
The deceased was killed as the result of a gunshot wound received at about 9:52 p.m. at 649 South
5th East in Salt Lake City, Utah (R. 142, 170). The deceased was married to Dixie Holland. They had two
children, but were separated (R. 247). A complaint
for divorce had been filed by the deceased' s wife
on September 18, 1964, to which the deceased had
filed a counterclaim (R. 337). At the time of the killing the divorce action was pending (R. 338). The deceased was living at the place where the shootinCJ
occurred and also had a small corporate business
there. The deceased's wife was living at 4351 South
13th East, Salt Lake City, Utah. The property where
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Dixie Holland resided was owned by the deceased
(R. 247). The deceased was under a restraining order
keeping him from the premises where his wife resided, except he retained a right to visit his children
on Wednesdays and certain weekends (R. 338, 339).
The appellant is, according to Dixie Holland,
a friend she met in early 1965 (R. 344). A neighbor of Dixie said the appellant was with Mrs. Holland quite frequently and estimated he was at her
home fifty percent of the time (R. 454, 455). Mrs. Hoiland testified he only stayed at her residence when
she was afraid of her husband or was not feeling
well, and that on these occasions they slept in separate rooms (R. 353). She did admit that she and the
appellant went to movies and bars together (R. 357),
and saw each other frequently (R. 357, 360).
Dixie likewise testified that she was considering
marrying appellant's brother, Ralph, and that another brother, Jack, had also been at her house
(R. 362).
On Mother's Day in May, 1965, Dixie went to
Smithfield to visit (R. 346). The deceased came to her
house where he found clothes of the appellant and
some clothing of the appellant's brothers. He broke
glass in the house and tore up the clothes (R. 301,
347, Exhibit 30). Subsequently, Dixie returned and
saw the condition of the house and moved in with
a friend, Mara Jones (R. 349).
The appellant was informed of what had happened by Dixie (R. 368). Dixie had, according to her, 1

-

1 Dixie Holland was an extremely evasive witness and not friendly to
the State's case (cf. R. 369 and her testimony generally). After her husband
was shot she made no inquiry as to his well being <R. 370).
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borrowed a rifle from appellant at an earlier date to
provide protection from deceased (R. 357). The rifle
had been loaded, and was placed in her car (R. 349).
The appellant borrowed Dixie's car, and although
appellant testified he did not know the gun was in
the car until he got to the house of deceased, Ardith
Wiley testified that she overheard a conversation
between appellant and Dixie at a bar earlier on May ;
10th at which time Dixie told appellant the gun was
in the car (R. 458). Ardith also had told appellant ii
he stayed away there would be no trouble (R. 458).
According to Ben Holland, father of the deceased, earlier on the night of May 10th around 8:00
p.m., his son received a phone call (R. 249). The
call upset his son, and his son repeated the words
on the phone, "Wipe me out, huh" (R. 253, 254). Tlw
circumstances surrounding the call and the conversation were received only to show the impact on
the deceased, and the jury was so cautioned by the
court (R. 253).
After receiving the call the deceased and his
father went to the police station to seek assistance
(R. 258). The police advised the deceased to seek a
complaint from the city prosecutor the next day
(R. 285). The deceased and his father then returned
to the deceased' s office (R. 259).
The appellant, after borrowing Dixie's car, to
gether with the appellant's father and two friends.
Ted Hildebrand and Gordie Adamson, went to th2
deceased' s place (R. 392). They had been drinkinrJ
at the Kozy Korner Bar at 6th West in Salt Lake Citv
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According to the appellant he went to deceased's
house to "collect" for his clothes in order to obtain
money for the purpose of buying more beer (R. 317,
398).
When they arrived at the deceased' s place they
pulled in the driveway at the side of the house and
honked the horn (R. 317, 393). The deceased's father
went out and asked them to leave, telling them it
they didn't there would be trouble (R. 262). According to the appellant's father the appellant then said
to Mr. Holland, "Tell that chicken-shit son of yours
to come out and pay for my clothes" (R. 317). The
deceased then came out on the porch and said, ''I
believe I am the one you're looking for" (R. 262).
The deceased had a shot gun and fired a round
down into the ground in the general direction of
the car, but quite a safe distance from it (R. 263, 152,
242). Thereafter, the deceased started back into the
house (R. 263). The deceased' s father saw a gun moving up in the back of the car (R. 263). According to
Ben Holland and appellant's father, Don Canfield,
about twenty to thirty seconds passed, then appellant shot the deceased in the hip with a 30.06 rifle
m. 318, 263). At the time of the shooting the deceased
was fumbling for the latch on the door to get back
inside (R. 263). According to investigating officers
there was a light directly across the street, one slightly up the street, and light from the house, 2 so that
the area was well lighted (R. 144, 145). The deceased
was also wearing a white shirt (R. 154).
'

The light from the house was corroborated by appellant.
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The appellant then backed the car out of tho
driveway and as he drove down the street with thE
lights off, deceased's father tried to shoot back w1fr:
the deceased's gun but it would not fire (R. 264, 2651.
He handed the gun to deceased who fired a sho1.
but apparently not in the area of the car (R. 265, 166
161).
According to the appellant's father, when they
went to the Holland place, he and his son under
stood it was for a fight (R. 316, 321, 331). They went
to deceased' s place because it did not appear that
deceased was going to come to the bar to fight
(R. 333). As a result of the wound in the hip Holland
died (R. 187, 205).
The appellant's father acknowledged his sor.
was a hunter and a good shot (R. 316). The appellanl
said he shot in self-defense, and only intended to
"wound" (R. 400). He also said after the first shc1
deceased again pumped his gun. He acknowledged
fifteen to twenty seconds passing between the dr:ceased' s shot and his, and said it could have been
thirty seconds (R. 399, 426). Appellant also contended he had not seen the rifle he used until Adan~
son gave it to him from the back seat after the firsi
shot was fired (R. 403).
Around April 22, 1965, the deceased had chased
appellant from deceased's wife's house with a han~:
mer (R. 386). Subsequent thereto, the appellant stateo
in the presence of Ardith Wiley that he would kiL
the deceased if he came around (R. 455)_
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The appellant was a convicted felon and the
deceased had served time in jail for contempt in
connection with his divorce action, had also been
arrested, and was said to be violent against his wife.
The jury, based on the above evidence, returned a verdict of guilty.
Other facts that may be relevant will be discussed in the argument portion of this brief.
-ARGUMENTPOINT I
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN
APPELLANT'S CONVICTION FOR SECOND DEGREE

MURDER.

The appellant contends the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for the crime of second degree murder. The basis of appellant's urging
is (1) the evidence does not demonstrate sufficient
proof of the elements of the crime, primarily malice.
and (2) the evidence does not overcome the appel ·
iant's defense that he shot in self-defense. RespondPnt submits the contentions approximate the frivolous.
The respondent submits that the appellant has
'liolated the principle that in appraising the suffi~iency of a jury's verdict of guilty the evidence with
:ill its inferences will be viewed in a light most favo!·:ihle to the jury's verdict. In State v. Ward, 10 Utah
'.d 34, 35, 347 P.2d 865, 869 (1959) this court observed
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as to the standard applicable to appellate review in
cases comparable to this:
The rules governing the scope of review on appeal as to the, sufficiency of the evidence to sustain
the verdict are well settled: that it is the prerogative
of the jury to judge the credibility of the witnesses
and to determine the facts; that the evidence will be
reviewed in the light most favorable to the verdict·
an4 that. if when so viewed it appears that the jury
actmg fairly and reasonably could find the defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the verdict will not
be disturbed.

In State v. Berchtold, 11 Utah 2d 208, 214, 357
P.2d 183, 186 (1960) this court commented:
We reverse a jury verdict only where we conclude from a consideration of all of the evidence and
the inferences therefrom viewed in the light most
favorable to such verdict that the findings are unreasonable.

Approaching the case from these standards
leaves no doubt as to the justification for the jury's
verdict.
Although the deceased had torn up some
clothes of the appellant, this act had occurred d
substantial period of time before the killing. The
destruction of the clothing could be found to have
been precipitated by appellant's having been livin~
with the deceased's wife. The appellant was told cf
the act. He knew that there was a gun in the deceased' s wife's car. He borrowed the car. He'd been
drinking. According to the appellant's father the deceased and his companions sought out the deceased
to have a fight. By the appellant's own admission he

1

9

went to the deceased' s home to "collect" for his
clnthes. He says he only sought money; however,
the father's testimony, the presence of the companions, the loaded rifle, and the statement of appellant to the deceased' s father to "tell that chicken-shit
son of yours to come out and pay for my clothes" all
lead to the conclusion that appellant went to the
deceased' s house for the purpose of getting even.
When appellant arrived at the deceased's place,
deceased' s father advised them to leave to avoid
trouble. This brought noting but an aggressive, obscene remark from the appellant, evidencing a state
of mind bent on vengeance. When deceased came
out of the house, although armed with a shotgun, he
shot the gun into the ground in an obvious warninq
fashion. He then turned to the side (R. 436), and was
attempting to re-enter the house when he was shot.
No violence was at that time being offered to the
appellant. Although appellant says the deceased
pumped his gun, no other witness corroborated this
testimony, and the testimony of the deceased's father
supports a contrary conclusion. Twenty to thirty seconds passed before appellant shot, enough time for
the appellant to remove himself from the area. Instead the appellant, a hunter and good shot, moved
the bolt action on the rifle, slid a round into the
chamber, aimed, and by his own admission shot deceased intending to wound him. He, in fact, killed
him while intentionally doing an act calculated to
oroduce great bodily harm.
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Thereafter, contrary to appellant's claim of self.
defense, he drove the car away with lights out, hid
it in a remote place, and gave the gun to one of his
companions to dispose of. He did not contact th12
police. The other witnesses to the shooting who
might support appellant's contention of self defense
were never called as witnesses. The only two persons testifying at trial who witnessed the event were
Don Canfield, appellant's father and Ben Holland,
deceased's father. Both witnesses' testimony is fully
supportive of the conclusion that appellant, the
aggressor, shot the deceased out of malice, and that
he went to deceased's place with the intent to fight.
The evidence is clear that the jury could find a sufficient time period between the shot of the deceased
and the shot the appellant fired. The jury could also
find that by the way deceased was turned, he was
trying to get back into his house when shot, and that
the area was sufficiently well lighted to apprise the
appellant that he was not in danger, and that he
killed out of vengeance. Further, the shot of the deceased was in the nature of a warning shot and the
jury could find not only that there was no danger to
appellant, but that he was the aggressor from the beginning. Under Utah law murder in the first degree
is specifically mentioned and defined; however, the
only reference to murder in the second degree is:
"Any other homicide committed under circum·
stances as would have constituted murder at common law is murder in the second degree." Utah
Code Ann. § 76-30-3 (1953).
Thus, excluded from second degree murder are
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the instances of use of poison, lying in wait, felony
murder, malicious and premeditated killing, and
killing under circumstances evidencing a depraved
mind. All other killings with malice, with the intent
to kill or do an act likely to produce great bodily
harm are murder in the second degree. With reference to the required intent for second degree
murder, this court said in State v. Russell. 106 Utah
116, 126, 145 P.2d 1003, 1007 (1944):
( 1) An intention or design previously formed to kill
or cause great bodily injury; or (2) an intention or
design previously formed to do an act or omit to do
an act, knowing that the reasonable and natural consequences thereof would be likely to cause death or
great bodily injury....

Thus the Russell case adopted the recognized rule
that unpremeditated murder can be satisfied by one
of two intentions: first, the intent to kill, or second,
the intent to do great bodily harm. The finding of
either intent is sufficient to warrant a conviction.
This court restated and further clarified the intent requirement for second degree murder in State
v. Jensen, 120 Utah 531, 532, 236 P.2d 445, 445 (1951):
With respect to his intent: It is the established
law of this state that in order to make the crime of
second degree murder the defendant must have intended to either (a) kill, or (b) do great bodily harm,
or ( c) do not act which would naturally and probably
cause death or great bodily harm to the deceased.

Thus the intent need only be to do great bodily

narm, to kill, or do an act that would naturally and
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probably cause death or great bodily harm to the deceased. The facts here clearly support such an intent.
Indeed, the admission of appellant was to the effec1
that he intended to wound the deceased, and he
used a high-powered rifle. The probable consequences were obvious.
In State v. Gallegos, 16 Utah 2d 102, 396 P.2d
414 (1964) this court upheld a conviction for second
degree murder where the killing resulted after a
gang contest. The court was in no way troubled
about the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the
conviction. See also State v. Frayer, 17 Utah 2d 282.
409 P.2d 968 (1966). Other decisions of this court have
sustained a conviction of murder in the second degree in similar instances. State v. Kukis, 65 Utah 362,
237 Pac. 476 (1925). In that case this court upheld a
conviction for second degree murder where defendant shot towards a train carrying workers to fl
mine during a strike. See also State v. Martinez, 56
Utah 351, 191Pac.214 (1920).
Generally, the term "malice" means an intentional act. Williams, Criminal Law § 30 (2d ed. 1961).
If the common law standard is to be applied, a shot
fired to induce fear or wound is done maliciously.
Ward v. Regina, 1 C.C.R. 356 (1872). Simple malice
is an entirely different thing than the malice afore
thought required in first degree murder, but even sr
it generally means to distinguish those "killings for
which no pardon could be expected from those
done in self-defense or by misadventure." Turner
Kenny's Outlines of Criminal Law 9 104 (18th ed.
(1962).
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To the same effect is Clark & Marshall, Crimes
5.05 (6th ed. Wingersky rev. 1958), where it is
stated:
In its popular sense, the term 'malice' means
hatred, ill will or hostility to another, but this is not
necessarily its meaning in law. In its broadest legal
sense, it means the state of mind of a person, irrespective of his motive, whenever he consciously violates the law.

The appellant in this case certainly had the required intent and acted with malice and the jury
was justified in so finding. 3
Appellant's contention that the evidence shows
he acted in self-defense is equally unmeritorious.
The shot by the deceased was provoked by the appellant and his companions, and the phone call
made to him before the visit of the appellant (which
the jury could conclude was from either appellant
or his companions) indicated appellant was the
aggressor. Under such circumstances he may not
claim the right of self-defense; further the facts here
presented are such that the jury could reasonably
conclude that the appellant did not shoot the deceased in self-defense.
A killing may be justified if done while "resisting any attempt to murder any person .... " Utah
Code Ann. § 76-30-10 (1) (1953). There was no attempt
to murder any person. The jury could reasonably
find appellant went to deceased's place to commit
violence and deceased shot into the ground in an
3 . The common law courts would clearly support a finding of guilty in
~1 1' case. See Rex v. Miller, Viet. L.R. 355 0951); See generally Stephen,
igest of the Criminal Law § 244(a) (5th ed.).
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effort to dissuade appellant and his companions.
Equally applicable is the same conclusion as to deceased's possible intent to do "great bodily injury."
A killing may also be justified "when committed in
the lawful defense of such person [doing the killing J
... when there is reasonable ground to apprehend
a design to commit a felony or to do some great
bodily injury and there is imminent danger of such
design being accomplished .... " Utah Code Ann.~
76-30-10 (3) (1953). Appellant's brief conspicuously
omits the remainder of the foregoing subsectio·1
which requires that the killer " ... must really and i:-i
good faith have endeavored to decline any further
struggle before the homicide was committed." Utah
Code Ann. § 76-30-10 (3) (1953).
The evidence clearly demonstrates that the appellant was the aggressor in going to the deceased'.::
place of residence and business; that he was asked
to leave by deceased' s father; that he went to fight.
that deceased shot into the ground; and that ther2
after deceased attempted to retreat. The time sp:J:!
was sufficient to allow appellant to "decline an·/
further struggle", however, he shot and killed deceased. There is, therefore, no legitimate basis fer
reversal. State v. White, 40 Utah 342, 121 Pac. 57?
(1912); State v. Law, 106 Utah 196, 147 P.2d 324 (1944 1
In the Law case, cited in appellant's brief, the co'..::'.
found in comparable circumstances of similar lega'.
import that the issue was fer the jury. In this ca::-2
the issue was for the jury and L.~e conviction W0. 3
justified.
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Further, the deceased would have had the right
to fire in self-defense. Utah Code Ann. § 76-30-10 (2)
'.1953). Obviously, the matter was for the jury and
their verdict cannot be said to be unreasonable.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN
RULING ON THE PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE.

The appellant contends that the trial court committed error in admitting the testimony of deceased's
father concerning statements made by the deceased
during a telephone conversation between the deceased and someone else a few hours before the
shooting. The record shows the trial judge admitted
such evidence only to show deceased's condition
and state of mind at the time of the phone call.
The record reflects the following (R. 253):
THE COURT: ... and for the record the Court will
reverse its ruling and permit the witness to answer.
I'll explain to the Jury that the Court, having heard
counsel in connection with this matter, is of the
opinion that the material requested, which question
comes under an exception to the hearsay rule and
would admonish you in this connection that the answer given is not proffered by the State to prove the
truth of the facts contained within the statement
that will now be made but as evidence of things that
were said of the condition and state of mind of the
deceased at the time when these statements were
made.
MR. BANKS:
tions.

And to explain his subsequent ac-

THE COURT:

It is offered only for those purposes.
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Q. (By Mr. Banks) As a caution, Mr. Holland, I
want you to answer specifically the questions and not
offer any opinions or anything that he might have
said to you or you said to him. So, now, at this time
I want to ask you as nearly as you can recall just
what your son said into the phone at that time.
A. 'No, but how about starting with you?' And then
there was a pause and, 'You are doing quite a lot of
talking. Who am I talking to? Gordie. Gordie, who?
Gordon Adamson.' And then there was some conversation I didn't get and he didn't say anything. It ran
for a little while and then he said: 'It doesn't make
any difference who can lick who but one way or another something has got to be done to stop this making a hangout of my home.' And there was not
much said then for a little while and then: 'Wipe me
out, huh? Just where are you? 1216 Pacific Avenue,
huh? How long are you going to be there? How about
meeting you there in thirty minutes?' And that was
about all that I recall.

Since the evidence was not used to prove the
truth of the matter asserted it was not hearsay. McCormick, Evidence § 225 (1954), states the definition
of hearsay as follows:
Hearsay evidence is testimony in court or written evidence, of a statement made out of court, such statement being offered as an assertion to show the truth
of matters asserted therein, and thus resting for its
value upon the credibility of the out-of-court
asserter.

Therefore, by definition the testimony of deceased's father was not hearsay. Further, a wel
recognized exception to the hearsay rule is that evi
dence otherwise relevant may be considered t:
show the state of mind of a person, or the reactior
1
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of a person to a stated phrase. McCormick, supra,
~ 228. McCormick op. cit. p. 464 observes:
When it is proved that D made a statement to X,
with the purpose of showing, circumstantially, the
probable state of mind of X, such as notice, knowledge, or motive, or to show the information which X
had as bearing on the reasonableness or good faith of
the subsequent conduct of X, the evidence is not subject to attack as hearsay. The same rationale applies
to proof by the defendant in cases of assualt or homicide of communicated threats made to him by the
person whom he is alleged to have killed or assaulted.
If offered to show his reasonable apprenhension of
danger it is not offered for a hearsay purpose. Its
value for these purposes does not depend on the truth
of the statement.

See also 2 Wigmore, Evidence, § 1790 (3rd ed.
(1940). 2 Wigmore, Evidence § 1789 (3rd ed. 1940)
notes:
Wherever an utterance is offered to evidence the
state of mind which ensued in another person in consequence of the utterance, it is obvious that no assertive or testimonial use is sought to be made of it,
and the utterance is therefore admissible, so far as
the Hearsay rule is concerned ....

Justice Wade observed in John C. Cutler Ass'n.
v. De Jay Stores, 3 Utah 2d 107, 115, 279 P.2d 700, 705
0 955) (concurring opinion):
However, if the fact of whether or not the statement
was made is a material issue in the case, or the statement accompanies an ambiguous or equivocal act
serving to complete and give it definite legal significance it is a verbal act which constitutes a material
fact in the case or if the fact that such statement was
made is a circumstance which tends to prove a mate-
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rial issue in the case such a statement is not being
used as testimonial evidence of the statement made
on the credit of the person making the statement who
is not a witness and therefore is not hearsay evidence. Where the 'question is not whether the statements are true, but whether they were made' such
statments are not excluded by the rule against hearsay.

Accord, Hurst v. State, 101 Miss. 402, 58 So. 206 (1912)
The statements made in the phone conversation
were relevant to show the reason for deceased's
having a shotgun; his fear and apprehension at the
presence of the car appellant was in; his reason fo:
going onto the porch; and even the reason for his
pattern of conduct during the evening. Further.
Gordie Adamson was present at the time of the killing, and his presence as well as the whole pattern
of circumstances bears direct relation to the phone
call. The fact that the call was not allegedly made
by the appellant, but rather by a companion is o:
no consequence, especially when appellant's fathe
testified that they were going to the deceased's place
to have a fight. The trustworthiness of the testimony
is clearly demonstrated by what transpired.
The final claim that the probativeness of the
testimony was outweighed by the possible prejudice
is not of concern since the determination of such·~
matter rests within the sound discretion of the tric.
court, and secondly, the evidence was hardly o:
prejudicial as appellant's father's testimony of
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projected fight and the actual killing. Obviously,
there is little merit to the appellant's contention.
Finally, the trial court carefully limited the purpose of the testimony, and in the absence of proof to
the contrary, it must be assumed that the jury followed the court's instructions.
Based on the foregoing discussion appellant's
contention that the testimony of deceased's father
was improperly admitted is wholly without merit
and provides no basis for a claim of error let alone
prejudicial error.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED A PROFFER OF EVIDENCE OF DECEASED'S CHARACTER
FOR VIOLENCE SINCE:
A.

The Evidence Lacked Proper Foundation.

B. The Evidence Was Cumulative.
C.

The Evidence Was Not Directly Relevent In View
of Appellant's Aggression.

FURTHER, ANY CLAIM OF ERROR COULD NOT BE
PREJUDICIAL IN VIEW OF OTHER EVIDENCE AND
THE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE TRIAL COURT.

It is submitted by the appellant that the trial
court erred in not receiving evidence of deceased's
violent nature. Quite obviously from the appellant's
.-:-iwn brief there was substantial evidence of the deceased' s violent nature, especially toward his wife.
Further, the trial court expressly instructed the jury
'1cll they could consider the evidence before them
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of the deceased's violent nature on the appellant's
claim of self-defense. For this reason and those fur_
ther set out herein it is submitted the trial courL
ruling on a proffer made by appellant will not support a basis for a claim of prejudicial error.
The appellant acknowledges in his brief, anJ
some authorities support a conclusion that befor::o
evidence of the deceased's violent character can b
accepted there must be some communication of tha'
fact to the accused. 2 Wigmore, Evidence § 246 (3rd
ed. 1940). A distinction must be drawn between evidence received to show the deceased' s violent character and its effect on the accused, and evidence
received as an explanation for the affray. See Wigmore, supra§§ 63, 246. In the former case some jurisdictions require a communication of the reputation
or character to the accused. Appellant assumes tha;
to be the applicable rule in Utah.
Bearing this rule in mind it is necessary to examine the exact context of the trial court's rulinc:r
The appellant called a Sergeant Strong to the stand
apparently to offer evidence of a particular event.
The proffer of appellant was (R. 448, 449):
MR. LUND: At this time, your Honor I make a
proffer of proof with regard to Sergeant Strong who
has just been called to the stand for the purpose and
reason to show or to present evidence with regard to
the character of the deceased pursuant to the exception to the hearsay rule with regard to testimony of
the violent nature of the deceased. It is submitted
to the Court that the Defendant, Melvin Canfield,
was not present at the time the action took placr
about which this witness will testify, the only evidencr
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in the record at this time being the reference to the
incident without naming the date and place by the
Defendant in Cross-Examination by the District Attorney.
THE COURT:
about-

Where he indicated he'd heard

MR. LUND: The evidence at that time, your Honor,
was that the defendant indicated he had heard about
a time when the deceased had threatened his brother
and a couple others in a car in addition to two police
officers without establishing the date as to when
this instance took place and I submit, your Honor,
that that reference to that particular happening tied
into the testimony of the officers pursuant to the
proffer of proof at this time is sufficient ground or
sufficient foundation for this testimony to be admitted at this time.

The court then indicated that it must be shown
that such evidence was known to the accused prior
to the incident giving rise to the charge (R. 449). The
appellant had on previous examination 4 only said he
knew of the incident but did not indicate he knew
of it at the time of the killing (R. 413, 448). Appellant
also on direct examination by his counsel had responded (R. 413):
Q. Do you know whether or not he had a reputation
for being violent?

That's all I have ever heard about the man is
that he is extremely violent and constantly waving
guns around at people and threatening to kill them.

A.

--4

The

examination where accused testified as to the deceased's reputation

· 'he rnrnrnunity was direct examination (R. 413).
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Thus there was evidence in the record of the
deceased's general reputation, but none showing ir
was known to the accused at the time of the killina.
This was according to the trial court a necessitj1
(R. 450). The trial court then indicated it would allov1
appellant to be recalled to establish the knowledge
factor (R. 450). The appellant's counsel indicated ha
would recall appellant, however, he never did bu!
rested (R. 452). Even if we assume the very principle
argued for by appellant, it is submitted that the
initial failure to prove his knowledge and apprehension at the time of the incident coupled with the
subsequent failure to offer proof when given a sec·
ond opportunity, shows that the claim of error is
not well taken.
In addition it is submitted that the proffer of the
appellant is not in accord with the position he now
takes on appeal. Appellant's proffer was only to the
effect that he would call the police officer to show
the time and place of the particular incident against
the officer (R. 448, 449). Since the incident was itsell
already a matter of record (R. 413), additional detail
would not be anything but cumulative and im·
proper. The trial court had sound discretion in this
regard. Further, although the authorities are spht.
evidence of specific acts of violence are not admis
sible in many cases. 5 People v. Rodawald, 177 N.Y.
408, 70 N.E. 1 (1904); State v. Velsir, 61Wyo.476, 159
P.2d 371 (1945); State v. Cavener, 356 Mo. 602, 202
S.W.2d 869 (1947); Home v. State, 116 So. 2d 654
· e Cf
5
This court does not appear to clearly have passed on t h e 'u~h 225
State v. Vacos, 40 Utah 169, 120 Pac. 497 (1911); State v. Mares, 113
192 P.2d 861 <1948).
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(Fla. App. 1959); Rothblatt, Handbook of Evidence
for Criminal Trials, 252-253 (1965). Consequently, it
is submitted the trial court did not commit error
prejudicial to appellant.
Further, it is submitted that where the record
otherwise was repleat with evidence showing the
hammer assault by deceased on the appellant, assaults or threats against deceased's wife, and the appellant's own testimony of the deceased's aggressiveness including the tearing of the clothes, the evidence proffered was cumulative and the trial court
could exclude the same in its sound discretion.
In addition, the evidence shows the appellant
went to the deceased' s home under circumstances
where he was the aggressor. This being the case
the question of evidence of deceased's violent character was of limited concern to the jury and the trial
court properly excluded it. Pointer v. State. 37 Ala.
App. 670, 74 So. 2d 615 (1954); Weaver v. State. 200
Ga. 598, 37 S.E.2d 802 (1946); State v. Malmay. 209
La. 476, 24 So. 2d 869 (1946); State v. Wilson. 234
Iowa 60, 13 N.W.2d 705 (1944).
Finally, it is submitted that when appellant's
claim is viewed in the context of the record in this
case, even if the trial court's ruling were error, it
could not have been prejudicial or affected his substantial rights. Utah Code Ann. § 77-42-1 (1953). No
i-',c1s1s for reversal can be validly claimed.
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POINT IV
THE APPELLANT'S ARGUMENT ON INSTRUCTIONS
ON SECOND DEGREE MURDER IS ACADEMIC.

In point IV of appellant's brief it is contended
that the trial court should not have instructed on
murder in the second degree because it was no!
raised by the evidence. Since it is clear that the evi·
dence supports the conviction for murder in the
second degree the instructions were properly given.
If the evidence had not supported the conviction
the case would warrant reversal in any event. Thus,
appellant's argument is academic.
-

CONCLUSION -

The evidence in the instant case clearly supports the appellant's conviction for second degree
murder when the evidence is weighed in light ol
the elements of the crime, and appraised on the
basis of the reasonable inferences the jury was al·
lowed to draw. The contention that the trial court
committed error in ruling on the admissibility of the
evidence does not stand up under examination ol
the record. This appeal is without merit and the con·
viction should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
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